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ROGER C. CRAMTON AND THE LEGAL
SERVICES CORPORATION
Charles W. Wolframt
The passing of my dear friend and former colleague Roger
Cramton leaves a void in legal ethics scholarship that will take
the skills, energies, and imaginations of many scholars to fill.
Legal ethics was the field in which both of us wrote and taught
(and, during one memorable semester, co-taught), but Roger
was far more than a legal ethics scholar. During his years of
active professorial work, his focus stretched beyond issues of
lawyer's ethics and professional responsibilities to many im-
portant issues in legal education, including administrative law,
civil procedure, conflicts of law, torts, and-through his de-
cades of service as one of the most energetic and engaged mem-
bers of the Council of the American Law Institute-a long list of
other evolving legal areas.
Roger was also one of the most active professors-on-loan
from the legal academy to government. Among other roles, he
served as the first lawyer that Congress confirmed as chairman
of the board of directors of the then-recently created national
Legal Services Corporation (LSC). It is Roger in that role, to
which he was appointed by Republican President Gerald Ford,
that I meditate on briefly here.
How that presidential confirmation came about tells much
about Roger. Mere months prior to Roger's nomination, then-
President Richard Nixon fired Roger as Legal Counsel to the
President because of Roger's principled insistence that Nixon's
attempt to impound certain funds appropriated by Congress
was an unconstitutional infringement of legislative powers.'
Shortly after firing Roger, Nixon resigned rather than undergo
impeachment proceedings in the face of his much more notori-
ous firing of another law professor, Archibald Cox, as the
Watergate Special Prosecutor. Within weeks after Nixon fired
t Charles Frank Reavis Sr. Professor Emeritus, Cornell Law School.
1 Roger later turned the episode into a law review article. See generally Roger
C. Cramton, On the Steadfastness and Courage of Government Lawyers, 23 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 165 (1990).
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Roger, Nixon's successor Gerald Ford nominated Roger as
chairman of the LSC. 2
When appointed to head the LSC, and throughout his
adult life as far as I know, Roger was unapologetically a Repub-
lican, if one of the moderate-Yankee side of that political party.
Certainly if measured by our contemporary political assump-
tions, the prospect would seem unpromising that a Republican
appointee would enthusiastically support the work of the LSC.
And, as can be testified to by all who knew Roger well enough,
he never undertook a task without exuberant enthusiasm. The
entire mission of the LSC was (and continues today) that of
channeling hundreds of millions in appropriated federal tax-
payer dollars to lawyers representing private, individual clients
of limited means-in short, the poor. Often those representa-
tions involved disputes with corporations, landlords, other pri-
vate citizens, and obdurate government agencies.
One may wonder how Roger's establishment Republican-
ism could embrace his enthusiastic furthering of the work of
the LSC. The Republican political party has defined itself, at
least since the time of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Great
Depression, as opposed to the federal government's efforts to
expand welfare and intrude into free markets. Both of those
perceived sins plainly seem fit to be laid at the door of the LSC.
Politically, Republicans have instead strongly favored corporate
constituents and bourgeois political figures such as landlords,
creditors, and others who would likely be adverse to LSC's
intended, poor clientele. Republicans would accordingly not be
expected to support funding for an agency set up to oppose
those interests. Moreover, to the extent that LSC clients com-
plained about their treatment by government agencies (one of
their chief complaints), Republicans would be expected to ob-
ject-and they did-that the government should not subsidize
lawsuits directed at the government itself.
In part, the apparent anomaly of Republican Roger's cham-
pioning the cause of the LSC says more about our contempo-
2 Roger recounted his LSC rebound in a fascinating living-history video in
which he was interviewed by his successor as Cornell's dean Peter W. Martin. See
Roger C. Cramton & Peter W. Martin, Roger C. Cramton - Clip 1, CORNELL UNIv. L.
SCH. HERITAGE PROJECT (June 1, 2004), https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/law-
school-heritage/15 [https://perma.cc/VFL9-8WB4]; Roger C. Cramton & Peter
W. Martin, Roger C. Cramton - Clip 2, CORNELL UNIV. L. SCH. HERITAGE PROJECT
(June 1, 2004), https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lawschool_heritage/16 ://
perma.cc/CA6N-U2WB]. Roger, while serving as LSC chair, also wrote the lead
article in a welfare law symposium. Roger C. Cramton, Promise & Reality in Legal
Services, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 670 (1976).
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rary vision of the philosophies of the two major political parties.
President Nixon, until he was run out of office for his leading
complicity in the Watergate scandal, embraced several political
positions that by today's Republican standards would be
anathema-such as successfully urging Congress to create the
now-Republican-accursed Environmental Protection Agency.
Creating the LSC was of a piece with that side of Nixon, sug-
gesting either uncharacteristic softness in that deftly-political
figure or, more likely, a bold political maneuver to mollify fel-
low3 and sister lawyers, whose national organization-the
American Bar Association (ABA)-strongly supported the LSC
and its predecessor federal agency.4 The ABA's support of the
LSC has continued unstintingly during succeeding
presidencies.
LSC has not been disfavored, of course, only during Re-
publican administrations. For example, during Democrat Bill
Clinton's second term as president, the control of the Congress
by "Contract with America" Republicans led to an effort in Con-
gress to slash LSC funding.5 Among lawyer opponents of the
3 Nixon was himself a lawyer, as were dozens of his lieutenants and political
operatives who were officially implicated in Watergate-related crimes. See
N.O.B.C. Reports on Results of Watergate-Related Charges Against Twenty-nine
Lawyers, 62 A.B.A. J. 1337 (1976) (reporting on the the National Organization of
Bar Counsel's study indicating that twenty-seven lawyers were named as defend-
ants or unindicted co-conspirators in criminal proceedings arising out of Water-
gate and two others were the subject of public bar discipline). Cramton briefly
traced Nixon's pre-Watergate political conversion from opposition to the proposed
LSC to support for its creation in his article Crisis in Legal Services for the Poor, 26
VILL. L. REV. 521, 525 (1981).
4 The ABA's support of publicly-funded legal service for the poor is politically
convenient. Among other considerations, LSC's lawyers have always been prohib-
ited from charging any fee to clients, which eliminates the prospect that they
would compete with private practitioners for fee-paying clients. The availability of
thousands of new lawyer jobs funded by LSC has proven beneficial during times of
low demand for newly graduated lawyers. Significantly, the presence of LSC law-
yers in any controversy ensures that those opposing LSC clients will themselves
need lawyers in controversies that would otherwise be highly unlikely to exist.
5 See, e.g., ABA Comm. On Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-399
(1996) (providing advice to LSC-funded lawyers on how to deal with ethical issues
raised by pending federal legislation that would cut LSC funding by at least
twenty-five per cent and further limit LSC's services); David Barringer, Downsized
Justice: With a Scaled-Down Legal Services Corp., Low-Income Clients Are Facing
the Cutbacks in Lawyers to Help Them On ... ,A.B.A. J., July 1996, at 60, 61
("Although legal services have successfully run the gauntlets of previous govern-
ment threats, most notably under the Nixon and Reagan administrations, this
time the future is bleak and the mood funereal."). Among other restrictions, in
1996, Congress passed a prohibition against the use of LSC funds to "amend or
otherwise challenge existing law," including Congress's own welfare laws. A 5-4
Supreme Court subsequently struck that down as an unconstitutional limitation
on the free-speech rights of lawyers and their clients and, because it threatened to
impair advocacy before federal courts, as inconsistent with the constitutional
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proposal were lawyers who were self-declared Republicans,
such as former state judge Bruce W. Kauffman. 6
Roger's own take on the politics and political theory justify-
ing his work promoting the LSC was expressed in his heartfelt
1981 law review article entitled Crisis in Legal Services for the
Poor.7 The "crisis" to which Roger referred involved the efforts of
President Ronald Reagan to eliminate LSC entirely or at least
severely restrict it. Reagan was no lawyer and thus did not
personally share whatever sympathies Nixon might have har-
bored for fellow and sister lawyers. Quite the contrary, Reagan
as governor of California had waged a long public battle against
the California Rural Legal Assistance program (CRLA), which
supported migrant farmworkers in their labor struggles with
growers and with Reagan as California's governor.8 The CRLA
program had been funded in part by the LSC's forerunner, the
Legal Services Program (LSP). The LSP in turn was housed
within the Office of Economic Opportunity-a major compo-
nent of President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society project.10
The mere change of names-from LSP to LSC-did nothing to
deflect Reagan from attempting to exact political vengeance by
vanquishing the LSC. Moreover, influential conservative
groups that supported Reagan such as the Heritage Founda-
tion"1 and the Conservative Caucus1 2 also agitated to cut off
LSC's federal funding.
principle of separation of powers. Legal Serys. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533
(2000).
6 E.g., Bruce W. Kauffman, A Conservative Plea to Save LSC, NAT'L L. J., April
10, 1995, at A19. A few years later, another effort by conservative Republicans
(and the Republican leadership of the House of Representatives) to slash LSC
funding was rejected by a substantial majority in the House of Representatives,
with the opposing vote including fifty-seven Republicans. See David Rogers,
House Votes Not to Slash Legal Services, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 1998, at A4, available
at https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB902277499948462000 [https://perma.cc/
3W4F-KRI9].
7 Cramton, supra note 3.
8 E.g., Jerome B. Falk, Jr. & Stuart R. Pollak, Political Interference with
Publicly Funded Lawyers: The CRLA Controversy and the Future of Legal Services,
24 HASTINGS L.J. 599 (1973); Warren E. George, Development of the Legal Services
Corporation, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 681, 683-87 (1976).
9 President Nixon had abolished the OEO by executive order in 1973, leaving
the Office of Legal Services (renamed the Legal Services Program) as its only
vestige. See George, supra note 8, at 695-96.
10 See generally A. Kenneth Pye, The Role of Legal Services in the Antipoverty
Program, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211 (1966).
11 Cramton, supra note 3, at 522 n.3 (citing HERITAGE FOUNDATION, MANDATE
FOR LEADERSHIP - PROJECT TEAM REPORT ON THE POVERTY AGENCIES (Oct. 22, 1980)).
12 Cramton, supra note 3, at 532.
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Roger's Crisis article was characteristic of most of his
work-robust, committed, enthusiastic, and yet fair-minded.
In light of continued presidential efforts to defund LSC,13 the
piece warrants rereading. For the most part, Roger is at pains
in the Crisis article to refute or at least deflect political argu-
ments launched from many conservative Republican sources
and a few from the left. Among the latter, Cramton convincingly
argues that the LSC cannot effectively redistribute wealth to
the poor through litigation and court rulings; rather, he argues
one should pursue wealth redistribution through the political
process. '4
Near the conclusion of his Crisis article, Roger turns to
what he considered to be the three major theoretical underpin-
nings supporting the concept of an LSC for poor clients in light
of enduring American values of justice.15 First, LSC provides
fair access to justice as it is practiced in the United States, and
in doing so, vindicates the system's aspiration to provide equal
justice to all. 16 In that light, access to the courts may be as
fundamental a right for the poor as the right of access to the
ballot box. "7 Second, LSC serves to correct an inevitable bias in
the law against the unrepresented poor.' 8 That bias exists be-
cause in general most law is made in the direct presence and
subject to the immense political pressure of those sufficiently
well-funded to achieve their political goals. Harkening back to
the law-reform aspirations of LSC, Roger believes that LSC pro-
vides the important capability to change or limit laws that
would otherwise systematically disfavor the poor. 19 Third, and
providing what Roger believed to be its "basic justification,"
LSC upholds the dignity of the individual by helping the poor to
help themselves. 20 Or, as Roger puts it in the article, "[w]hat
further justification is required other than: 'Because [the poor]
need [legal representation] and they are important?"'21
Roger did not live long enough to witness-with rekindled
outrage, we can be sure-the current threats of the newly in-
stalled Trump Administration to reprise earlier Republican at-
13 See infra p. 6.
14 See Cramton, supra note 3, at 551-53
15 Id. at 553.
16 Id. at 553-54.
17 Id. at 554.
18 Id. at 554-55.
19 Id. at 555.
20 Id.
21 Id.
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tempts to limit or extinguish the work of LSC. 2 2 As it did during
prior political attacks on the LSC, the organized bar has joined
the fray in its defense. 23 Whether the 2017 attacks on the LSC
prove to be successful or not over the remainder of the current
term of Congress, 24 they indicate that the survival and work of
LSC will remain problematical, as has been its fraught state
almost since its founding over forty years ago. Whatever the
strength of arguments, such as Roger's, for LSC's existence
and the worth of its work, the LSC seems inevitably to be fated
to remain mired in partisan politics. Candidly, one has to say
that Roger's enthusiasm for the LSC was a political aberration,
representing the public-spiritedness and compassion of one
remarkable man, and not anything that could become a com-
mitted principle of the political party to which on many other
issues he at least nominally aligned himself.
22 E.g., Jeanne Sahadi, Lawyers Fear Trump May Kill Legal Aid Funding for
the Poor, CNN MONEY (Mar. 9, 2017, 6:44 PM), http://money.cnri.com/2017/03/
09/news/economy/trump-budget-cuts/index.html [https://perma.cc/94K7-
RRNQ] (reporting on a letter signed by over 150 law firms to White House Budget
Director Mick Mulvaney opposing proposed elimination of federal funding for
LSC).
23 E.g., Lee Rawles, The Fight for Legal Services, A.B.A. J., June 2017, at 64
(recounting multiple ways in which the ABA has opposed the Trump Administra-
tion's intent to defund the [SC, including joint letters of support by heads of more
than 150 U.S. law firms, the deans of 166 law schools, and general counsels of
185 companies).
24 The outcome, at least for one fiscal year, was a success for the LSC. Despite
the Trump Administration's attempt to defund the LSC, Congress ultimately voted
(and Trump was politically constrained to sign) legislation that provided an addi-
tional $25 million in funding, bringing the total for fiscal year 2018 to $410
million. See Rhonda McMillion, A Capitol Effort, A.B.A. J., June 2018, at 67.
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